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ABSTRACT 
Citizens have an expectation that emergency responders will come to their aid during 
emergencies.  There is the general assumption that these responders and the agencies they 
work for are prepared for any type of event.  With a core element of any disaster response 
being the capability of the emergency responders, a lack of personal preparedness by 
emergency response personnel is likely to be highly detrimental and reduces this 
capability when responders are needed to respond to a catastrophic event.  Past incidents 
and research has indicated that emergency responders may not respond until they ensure 
their own families safety.  Emergency responders do not have the option to assist 
voluntarily during a disaster—they must respond to ensure citizen safety and security 
while maintaining order.    
This research used a nationwide survey of emergency responders to determine 
why emergency responders are not personally prepared and what factors may influence 
increasing their personal preparedness level.  The result of this research identified three 
reasons why emergency responders do not personally prepare for disasters and concludes 
with recommendations that involve five incentives or motivations on how emergency 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The topic of emergency responder personal preparedness has not received as 
much attention as other homeland security and emergency management initiatives. Prior 
research has shown that the general public has abdicated their safety and security to 
emergency responders in the initial 72 hours after catastrophic events or disasters.  
Responders are expected to be prepared in order to respond to any type of event. In order 
for the response to be effective and successful emergency responders need core 
preparedness, protection, response, and recovery capabilities.  A core component of these 
capabilities is personal preparedness.  Prior research and a failure of responders to show 
up to work during past disasters suggest that emergency responders are not adequately 
personally prepared for disasters. This research will initiate findings and be an impetus to 
future research on this topic. 
The research presented contains six chapters: 1) Introduction; 2) Literature 
Review; 3) Preparedness; 4) Research Methodology and Design; 5) Results and Analysis; 
and 6) Conclusion. 
The introduction chapter outlines the research question as well as the thesis 
argument, problem statement, and practical significance of the research.  The practical 
significance of the research focuses on the development of further literature on 
emergency responder personal preparedness, future research to be conducted, who the 
immediate consumers of this research are, and how this research will benefit homeland 
security practitioners and leaders nationally. 
Chapter II, the literature review, provides an examination of four topic areas.  
These include government documents, Hurricane Katrina case study, books, and prior 
research and theses applicable to this topic. 
The third chapter explores three sections of preparedness.  The first section briefly 
examines the question, “What is preparedness?” from the Civil Defense Act of 1950 to 
the present. The second section provides a comparative analysis between the United 
States and Israeli preparedness and the final section examines aspects of the psychology 
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of preparedness.  This last section also reviews the Citizen Corp personal behavior 
change model for disaster preparedness (PDP) and associated theories and models.  The 
chapter aims to demonstrate how a community approach to behavior change may increase 
responder personal preparedness. 
In Chapter IV, the methodology of the research is presented.  It explains the 
purpose of the research, how the research was conducted, the survey tool, and structure 
used to gather the data, as well as the survey population. 
The results and analysis of the research is presented in Chapter V.  Each question 
from the survey is accompanied with an analysis of each as appropriate.  Tables and 
graphs are displayed to assist with providing a clear understanding of the survey results 
and analysis. 
The final chapter is the conclusion and outlines six recommendations.  The 
reasons why emergency responders are not prepared in addition to the incentives or 
motivators to increase personal preparedness are also presented. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the amount of homeland security money and preparedness programs that 
have been made available to emergency responders since September 11, 2001, why have 
some emergency response personnel still failed to prepare themselves and their 
immediate family members adequately for a major disaster?  Are there locations in the 
United States where emergency response personnel and their families or specific 
disciplines (police, fire, emergency medical services [EMS]) are more prepared?   
B. THESIS ARGUMENT  
The claim is that it is not known why emergency responders are not personally 
prepared even though personal preparedness programs such as Ready Responder have 




preparedness kits and plans will help to identify what incentives are needed to increase 
the emergency responders’ personal preparedness before a disaster occurs which leads to 
an increase in their effectiveness during disasters.    
This is important because if the question why emergency responders are not 
prepared is not answered, the programs created to prepare them will not be effectively 
implemented. This will lead to a cascading effect during disasters that causes confusion, 
chaos, and uncertainty among emergency responders.  Sixty one percent of a population 
surveyed in a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Citizen Corp study 
stated those citizens rely on help from police, fire, and emergency personnel during the 
first 72 hours of a disaster (FEMA, 2009, p. 22).   
The Ready Responder program provides the templates and information needed to 
get emergency responders personally prepared; however, without knowing the incentives 
needed to implement the program from the responders’ perspective, these templates and 
information will be and in some cases have been disregarded.  If responders do not have 
personal preparedness plans in place and a disaster occurs they will either: 1) be less 
effective on duty due to being worried about whether or not their family was able to 
evacuate, shelter in place properly, or be appropriately protected; or 2) the emergency 
responder will leave work or fail to show up for work in order to properly care for their 
family.   
The evidence to support this was witnessed during the 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
when police officers of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) failed to show up at 
work due to potential personal preparedness matters (Deflem & Sutphin, 2009).  
Additionally, a study by Martin deMassi of the Payson, Arizona Fire Department 
revealed a majority of emergency responders surveyed had not created a personal 
preparedness plan but if they did have a plan, it would positively affect their response 
(n.d.).   
One assumption is that emergency responders’ do not personally prepare due to a 
lack of frequent disasters, major disasters, or the potential of significant disasters 
occurring where they live or work.  Additionally, emergency responders may not think 
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about personal preparedness, do now know what to do, how to do it or feel it is too costly 
and difficult to create personal preparedness plans.  Furthermore, it is assumed that a lack 
of preparedness funding dedicated to emergency responder preparedness initiatives as 
well as no personal preparedness policies or requirements by emergency response 
agencies negatively affect what level of personnel preparedness is in place. 
Understanding why emergency responders are not personally prepared will assist 
with personal preparedness processes needed to increase the responder personal 
preparedness level nationwide.  These methods will be outlined in the recommendations 
and concluding chapter of the research.  The assumption is that some form of incentives 
need to be incorporated with a preparedness program for emergency responders. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
When citizens need assistance, they are taught to call 9-1-1 and emergency 
responders go to their aid.  There is the general assumption that these responders and the 
agencies they work for are prepared for any type of event.  A core element of any disaster 
response is the capability of the emergency responders.  A lack of personal preparedness 
by emergency response personnel is likely to be highly detrimental and reduces this 
capability when responders are needed to respond to a catastrophic event.  Currently, 
there is a lack of information and data indicating why emergency responders and their 
families are not adequately personally prepared for disasters. 
While at the Iowa Homeland Security Conference in 2006, DHS Undersecretary 
of Preparedness, George Foresman, asked 400 local and state emergency management 
officials how many of them had “detailed personal and family disaster plans” with only 
five of the 400 of these “trusted experts” indicating they “were as prepared as they advise 
(d) everyone else to be” (Emergency Preparedness Institute, 2007, p. 3).  A survey of 
public safety personnel by Martin deMassi (n.d.) of the Payson, Arizona Fire Department 
revealed that 82 percent of the public safety officials he surveyed had not completed a 
preparedness plan.  Additionally, deMassi noted that 78 percent of the respondents agreed 
that the “existence of a preparedness plan would positively affect their willingness to 
respond to an incident” (n.d., p. 24).   
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The lack of personal preparedness by responders was evident in 2005 during 
Hurricane Katrina.  Two hundred fifty officers of the New Orleans Police Department left 
the area and failed to show up at work in order to potentially take care of their families 
(Deflem & Sutphin, 2009).  This is understandable given the situation faced by the 
responders.  From their viewpoint, they “not only faced a loss of work-related facilities, 
but also had to deal with their own personal loses, including the destruction of their 
homes and suffering of family members” (Deflem & Sutphin, 2009, p. 45).  
According to the Emergency Preparedness Institute (2007), there is a suggestion 
that “fear and apathy play a major role in the apparent lack of preparedness actions 
taken” (p. 14).  The institute further asserts that some of the major reasons for failing to 
prepare are that people “1) do not think about it, 2) are not concerned that an event will 
impact them, 3) do not know what to do, or 4) feel that preparedness takes too much time 
and/or costs too much money” (2007, p.14). The Citizen Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) training and FEMA Are You Ready campaign are geared toward increasing 
voluntary citizen preparedness as well as voluntary citizen response capability.  
Emergency responders do not have the option to assist during a disaster voluntarily—they 
must respond to ensure citizen safety and security while maintaining order.  General 
citizen preparedness is not sufficient for responders or their family members to ensure 
personal preparedness.  The added stress of being required to help others when one is not 
being helped or not prepared will affect response.1 
There are negative consequences for failing to address a lack of emergency 
responder and responder family preparedness.  A 2005 study by Thomas Nestel, utilizing 
the 15 National Planning Scenarios, revealed “55–66 percent of police officers reported 
they would refuse to adhere to an emergency recall or would consider abandoning their 
position based upon concerns  for the safety of their family” (as cited in Landahl & Cox, 
                                                 
1 During Hurricane Katrina, according to Gebaurer (as cited in Deflem & Sutphin, 2009, p. 44), “some 
250 officers of the NOPD were reported to have deserted the city during the storm.  At least two NOPD 
officers committed suicide.” 
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2009, p. 3).  Additional studies2 support the notion of a lack of ability of the responders 
to respond effectively, due to concerns for their family’s safety.  If a large number of 
emergency responders are absent or assisting their families during a disaster, then the 
affected areas are more vulnerable to the criminal element as well as civil disorder.  
Furthermore, without responders to assist citizens in need, an increase in injuries and 
deaths may occur. 
Currently, no specific guidance is given in the Target Capabilities List (TCL) to 
“deal directly with the individual and family preparedness of responders” (Landahl & 
Cox, 2009). 
D. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT 
1. The Literature 
As previously noted, there is limited literature on personal preparedness and 
emergency responders.  By using the methodology described, a significant amount of 
information will be obtained on the personal preparedness of emergency responders 
(specifically law enforcement, fire, and EMS personnel).  The intent is to identify those 
factors that may influence the responder’s to achieve the appropriate personal 
preparedness level so they are more effective during disasters as well as increasing the 
probability they and their families are protected during these events.  The information and 
data obtained will fill a research void that has been created on emergency responder 
personal preparedness. 
2. Future Research Efforts 
To assist with future research, additional data was collected, which took minimal 
time for participants to answer, yet provided the data needed for future analysis.  For 
                                                 
2 As cited in Landahl & Cox (2009), a study of National Capital Region (NCR)  police officers 
conducted by Nancy Demme (2007) “revealed that family preparedness safety were determinant factors in 
the ability and willingness of police officers to respond for assignment in a biological incident” (p. 2).  
Another study by John Delaney (2008) of fire fighter’s from the NCR, a study of healthcare workers by 
Kristine Qureshi and others (2005), and a study of Emergency Medical Technicians by Charles DiMaggio 
and others (2005) yielded similar results as Demme’s 2007 study on police officers. 
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example, information relevant to future research on emergency responders risk 
perception associated with FEMA regions, counties within the regions, by number of 
Presidential Disaster Declarations (year 2000 to 2010), or frequency, magnitude, and type 
of disasters was collected.  Additionally, the data obtained will allow for future research 
on the specific type of responder (law enforcement, fire, or EMS) as well as by rank/level 
within the agency or employment status.  Particular interest may be shown by EMS 
research into differences between private and public EMS agencies. 
3. The Immediate Consumer 
The immediate consumers of this research will be those identified emergency 
responder agencies, their administrators, emergency management and homeland security 
directors, and training coordinators.  By understanding why responders are not personally 
prepared, training programs may be designed and properly implemented around those 
identified reasons.  The conclusions and recommendations will allow for proper planning 
for disaster response using relevant implementation and incentive methods. 
4. Homeland Security Practitioners and Leaders Nationally 
This research will assist emergency responders and their respective agencies in 
implementing personal preparedness programs.  It provides information on why 
emergency responders are not personally prepared and identifies incentives for the 
program managers of the Ready Responder program that may increase preparedness 
levels and assist with program evolution.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a significant amount of literature on citizen personal preparedness; 
however, personal preparedness efforts specifically geared toward first responders and 
their families is limited.  The topic of responder/responder family preparedness, 
compared to citizen preparedness, has not received as much attention or funding as other 
homeland security and emergency management initiatives.  This literature review 
examines emergency responder and responder family personal preparedness by 
examining the sub-literatures of 1) government documents; 2) books; 3) case studies; and 
4) research and theses on this topic. 
A. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
The government documents within this literature review demonstrate the need and 
requirement for research on first responder preparedness.  One federal document, the 
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Department of Homeland Security 
[DHS], 2007d), provides the guidance and scope of national preparedness.  This strategy, 
in addition to the FY 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program (DHS, n.d.), stresses that 
preparedness is a core responsibility and funding is needed for state, local, tribal, and 
territorial governments to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from all 
hazards—including potential terrorist attacks.  Additional guidance on preparedness is 
found in the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS, 2008b), which evolved from 
its predecessor, the National Response Plan (NRP) (DHS, 2004).  While the evolution to 
the NRF has generally changed in name only, the updated name reflects its purpose, 
which is to frame or “define the key principles, roles, and structures that organize the way 
we respond as a Nation” (DHS, 2008, p. 1).  All the above documents create the 
preparedness foundation for the United States in general but do not specifically focus on 
emergency responders and their family’s preparedness.  
The National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2007a) were created under 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8).  The guideline provides the 
nation’s overall preparedness goal as well as introduces the tools, the National Planning 
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Scenarios (Homeland Security Council, 2006), the Universal Task List (DHS, 2007a), 
and the Target Capabilities List (DHS, 2007c), which are needed for the United States to 
be prepared for all hazards.  A review of the tools reveals that the preparedness initiatives 
are too narrowly focused on community preparedness and participation and do not 
address responder and responder family preparedness.  The 2007 Target Capabilities List 
(DHS, 2007c) is described in the literature as a “living document” (p. viii), which should 
permit it to be updated after future research and as new events occur. 
A new National Preparedness Goal was released in September 2011 under a new 
administration.  This Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) 
seems to replace HSPD-8.  PPD-8 describes the nation’s “security and resilience posture” 
through the core capabilities of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery 
(DHS, 2011, p. 1).  Just as HSPD-8 provided the nation’s overall preparedness goal and 
tools to meet that goal, PPD-8 describes the nation’s approach to disaster preparedness.  
With implementation of PPD-8, the TCL appears to have evolved to capability targets 
which are defined as dynamic and can be refined.  The response mission area capability 
and planning target is supposed to use a systematic process to meet defined objectives.  
This target is getting closer to meeting the appropriate emergency responder personal 
preparedness initiative that could move the personal preparedness needle closer to the 
critical objective of increasing responder personal preparedness.  This research or future 
research may be the impetus to refine capability targets related to responder personal 
preparedness. 
B. CASE STUDY 
1. Hurricane Katrina 
Case study literature that specifically addresses responder or responder family 
preparedness is limited.  One disaster, Hurricane Katrina August 23, 2005, is used to 
demonstrate lessons learned among multiple disciplines.  Regarding emergency 
responders, past case studies of disasters have focused on the management of critical 
incident stress post disaster.  Deflem and Sutphin (2009) pointed out that responders are 
 11
required to help others but during a disaster will also have to deal with personnel 
tragedies during and immediately after the disaster (pp. 41–49).  Additionally, the 
Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement’s case study (Jackson, 2005) of Hurricane 
Katrina provides recommendations specific to law enforcement and identified the need 
for shelter sites and evacuation plans for first responder families.  However, neither of 
these studies identified why responders were not personally prepared particularly when 
they were in a hurricane prone area.   
In other case studies there are similar problems consistently noted:  
communications failures, disjointed command, and lack of pre-planning.  Donahue and 
Tuohy (2006) analyzed 21 after action reports that provide a basis for their findings of 
why people do not learn from past mistakes.  Additionally, they identify potentially key 
components of how to increase responder preparedness—incentives and changes in 
“structure, system, and culture” of the organization to adjust behaviors (Donahue & 
Tuohy, p. 21).  Although their findings did not specifically address responder 
preparedness, their analysis could very well be applied to this topic. 
C. BOOKS 
As with the case studies, books written on responder preparedness are narrow.  
One book, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United 
States, by Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001), provides a very thorough review of 
literature on disaster preparedness and response; however, the topic of what causes 
responders not to prepare for disasters or prepare at different levels is not adequately 
covered. In addition, the literature reviewed is mostly in the time frame of the 1970s thru 
the 1990s with a few publications from the year 2000.  None of the literature reviewed by 
Tierney et al. (2001) is post September 11, 2001.  The book does identify a few key 
concepts relevant to this research: (1) that while it is important to understand household 
preparedness it is equally important to understand preparedness for government 
organizations such as emergency response agencies; and (2) further research is needed to 
determine what motivates people to increase and sustain their preparedness levels. 
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An additional piece of literature read was the Are You Ready? guide from FEMA 
(2004).  This is used in conjunction with FEMA’s independent study course, IS-22.  As 
was noted with previous pieces of literature, this is focused on citizen preparedness.  The 
information contained in Are You Ready?, all hazards and basic preparedness, are 
applicable to everyone but it does not cover how emergency responders are affected by a 
lack of disaster preparedness or how they should implement a preparedness culture within 
their agency.  The intent behind the book, why citizens prepare and developing citizen 
preparedness, is prefaced by information on the Community Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) training and Citizen Corp programs (Federal Emergency Management Agency 
[FEMA], 2004).  The Are You Ready? (FEMA, 2004) guide was published in August 
2004 and the Ready Responder (FEMA, 2010b) program was released in September 
2010.  The Ready Responder program appears to parallel FEMA’s guide and may also 
provide valuable research material for this topic. 
D. PRIOR RESEARCH AND THESIS 
The most relevant literature on this topic has come from recent research and 
theses conducted.  The Naval Postgraduate School alone has produced four theses 
relevant to this topic since 2006.  These were conducted by Alicia Welch (2006), 
Annemarie Conroy (2008), Brian Sturdivant (2009), and Nicholas Campasano (2010).   
Robert Hudson from the Portage Fire Department in Michigan wrote a research 
paper for the National Fire Academy focused on identifying “criteria for developing a 
guide for emergency responders and their families in the event of a multi-day 
deployment” (2005, p. 5).  Hudson’s research included two feedback instruments in the 
form of surveys: one for individual emergency responders and the other to department 
administrators.  His conclusions are that pre-planning for an event minimizes those 
negative attributes that contribute to the decreased effectiveness of responders. 
Sturdivant used a similar methodology as Hudson in that he used surveys and 
interviews; however, he branches out and breaks down his surveys and interviews by 
local level command officers, Naval Postgraduate cohort members with significant 
experience, and finally state and federal emergency management professionals from five 
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of the 10 FEMA regions.  He concludes that in order to increase responder safety and 
effectiveness an increase in funding, support for a mega-community, using a military 
model for family support initiatives, and taking an all-hazards approach to preparedness 
is needed (2009).  
Alicia Welch (2006) in her thesis noted that there are administrative barriers 
which have impeded preparedness efforts in the fire fighter culture.  These barriers, as 
identified by Welch—complacency, indifference, ignorance, and conservatism—may 
also be factors that influence the law enforcement or EMS culture in their personal 
preparedness efforts. Her research, under the Naval Postgraduate School, and her 
yearlong fellowship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has led to 
assisting the DHS roll out the Ready Responder program.   
In reviewing Annemarie Conroy’s thesis (2008) on citizen preparedness, it 
becomes clear that there has been a disproportionate amount of federal support for citizen 
personal preparedness versus emergency responder personal preparedness.  Conroy adds 
to the other theses reviewed and supports how important preparedness is by stating, “In 
recognizing that ‘more needs to be done’ a clear understanding of who is and who is not 
prepared—AND WHY—is essential to any further national efforts” (2008, p. 12).  
Conroy identifies important components with citizen preparedness that will assist in 
researching why emergency responders do not personally prepare.  It is the sociological 
and psychological factors, as discussed by Conroy, as well as the human behavior and 
disaster study by Dennis Mileti (n.d) that could assist in identifying that WHY factor. 
Studies and polls have also been used to measure citizen preparedness; however, 
Annemarie Conroy (2008) noted in her research that these surveys and polls do not 
always measure what individuals have done versus how prepared they believe they are.  
This lack of a consistent measurement of preparedness is a concern if a poll or survey is 
completed during this research.   
In Campasano’s thesis (2010), he delves into the psychology of preparedness by 
reviewing and identifying limitations of the Citizen Corps personal behavior change 
model for disaster preparedness (PDP).  He posits that preparedness programs have not 
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done enough to engage community members and that social influence is not a factor in 
the PDP.  The result of his research is that individual and community behavior change 
theories are more appropriate to increase preparedness levels.  These models, in 
additional to the PDP, need to be understood in order to effectively implement personal 
preparedness behavior change within the emergency responder culture. 
Martin deMassi, Payson Fire Department in Arizona, also conducted surveys of 
102 emergency responders from police and fire dependents; however, he states that the 
majority were from the town of Payson, which may make the results too localized for this 
thesis.  Regardless, his surveys provide a snapshot of the number of responders who do 
not have a personal preparedness plan in place as well as factors that could entice them to 
do so and where the responsibility lies to implement such a program.  The surveys and 
interviews by deMassi, Hudson, and Sturdivant as well as other research noted above are 
relevant to this research but none ask why responders have not prepared.   
E. SUMMARY 
As stated, there is limited literature that specifically relates to the personal 
preparedness of emergency responders.  Recent research in the form of theses has 
provided the most relevant and timely information on this topic.  The government 
documents make the assumption that emergency responders are or will be personally 
prepared for any incident, and therefore the literature focuses on preparedness efforts to 
be taken by the citizen population.  Case study literature is also limited.  The main case 
study is the response efforts during Hurricane Katrina.  Additional data will be needed as 
using one case study from one region may not be indicative of a lack of responder 
personal preparedness nationwide or in other regions.   
The number of books written on responder personal preparedness is minimal, 
which continues to indicate the need for further research on this topic.  The thesis by 
Naval Postgraduate student, Alicia Welch (2006), was the impetus to creating the Ready 
Responder (FEMA, 2010b) program.  While the program instructs what responders have 
to do to prepare personally, it does not provide data or reasons why emergency  
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responders do not prepare.  Additionally, no data has been obtained to assist in answering 
the question why or to indicate if the problem is regional, discipline specific, or based on 
disaster frequency, potential magnitude of the incident, or both. 
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III. PREPAREDNESS 
In broad terms, disaster preparedness is planning, equipping, training, and 
exercising in order to create or sustain capabilities in order to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of disasters. This chapter looks at the 
construct of preparedness as related to emergency responders, a review of preparedness 
efforts in Israel and the applicability of these efforts within the United States, and finally 
behavior change models and related theories are reviewed and analyzed to determine the 
most effective ways to improve and advance emergency responder personal 
preparedness.    
A. WHAT IS PREPAREDNESS? 
Not until after the attacks of September 11, 2001 did disaster preparedness once 
again become a priority for the United States.  To protect against a military attack, basic 
preparedness principles were taught to citizens by means of the Civil Defense program in 
the 1920s under the Council of National Defense.  The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 
was the first comprehensive emergency planning legislation in the United States with the 
intent to “provide a system of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the 
United States” (Dynes, 1994, p. 142).  While this was a potential mechanism to provide 
natural disaster assistance, this effort was more geared toward enemy attacks on the 
United States than disasters.  After many evolutions of change, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and eventually the Department of Homeland Security  took over 
these preparedness efforts and the preparedness focus shifted to natural disasters; 
however, with longer periods of time between catastrophic or harmful events 
“psychological and biological systems typically show the simple return to baseline” 
levels due to decay or dissipation (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo,  
2007, p. 176).  Staying at this baseline level without periodic damaging or frightening 




According to Klonglan et al., as cited by Gillespie and Streeter (1987, p. 155), there is a 
practical significance of preparedness in that it has the “potential to save lives and to 
increase control over disaster response activities.” 
An August 2009 Citizen Corp National Survey, comparing 2003 results with 2009 
results, indicate that actual preparedness and perceived preparedness are two very 
different things.  While 57 percent of those surveyed reported having “supplies set aside 
in their home to be used only in the case of a disaster” less than 44 percent updated the 
supplies annually (FEMA, 2009, p. 7).  Additionally, of the 57 percent who reported 
having supplies, there were few numbers of people who had complete supply kits which 
contain critical items such as “flashlights, radios, batteries, first aid kits, and personal 
documents” (FEMA, 2009, p. 7). 
The survey results indicated reliance by the general public on emergency 
responders to help them during the first 72 hours of a disaster as well as this being a 
reason why they had not prepared for disasters (FEMA, 2009).  However, in an interview 
conducted by Nancy Demme in 2007 as part of her Naval Postgraduate studies, one 
officer interviewed stated, “I always said that if something horrific happens, I’m not 
going. I’m going with my family” (Demme, p. 34).  This reiterates the need to identify 
those willing and able to report for duty during a disaster.  Response and recovery will be 
critically impacted without emergency responders to respond to the incident. 
In order to measure preparedness it first must be defined and there is yet to be 
consensus on this definition among agencies, locations, or disciplines.  However, 
consensus as to “what” preparedness represents may not be necessary.  The construct of 
preparedness should be a standard set of categories while allowing agencies to choose 
what represents preparedness or what should be emphasized based on their needs.  
Because preparedness is pluralistic in nature, it should take into account four capabilities: 
(1) provisions or critical supplies, (2) skill-level, ones knowledge and ability to act during 
an emergency or disaster, (3) planning, how ones community or family will act in a 
coordinated manner, and (4) protection, being able to overcome, mitigate, or minimize 
the results of a disaster (Kirschenbuam, 2002, p. 17).  For example, emergency 
responders in California would have a need for certain provisions, skills, planning 
 19
components, and protective measures for wildfire emergencies whereas responders in 
Michigan would have a need for these capabilities for severe winter storms versus 
wildfires.  Both have a need for all four areas of capability, yet each has its own focus of 
where the emphasis is placed. 
B. PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS AND THE ISRAELI MODEL 
Israeli participation by the general public in exercises and drills has “played a 
significant role in allowing the public to familiarize itself with procedures and skills of 
emergency response and recovery” (Homeland Security Institute [HSI], 2009, p. 79).  
This approach of public participation could be applied to emergency responder families 
in the United States for all hazard preparedness; however, fully implementing public 
participation in the United States as Israel has done is not realistic due to significant 
factors specific to Israel.  These factors include Israel’s proximity to border nations with 
the intent and capability to attack, a smaller country size and population than the United 
States, and a history of attacks against them.  Israel has a more defense-based posture due 
to the threat of mortars, rockets, and annihilation by neighboring Arab armies versus the 
United States all hazards posture with a higher propensity for damage sustained from 
natural hazards.  Implementing a personal preparedness and participation program with 
families of emergency responders is useful for planning, training, exercising, policy or 
procedure development, and is also accomplishable.  Israel utilizes a public engagement 
program consisting of a series of national drills and protective measures to increase 
preparedness by the general public and foster more engagement between the emergency 
responders and the public.  Emergency response agencies in the United States can do the 
same to increase engagement between the agency, the responders, and their families. 
Using risk-based scenarios coupled with responder family participation in 
emergency readiness and preparedness training or drills, as the Israeli government has 
done, will assist in responders becoming more resilient and prepared for any disaster and 
minimizing the chances of cascading effects from those disasters. 
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Emergency responders and their families need to:  
…vigilantly be prepared for large scale, mass-casualty events, including 
bioterrorism, airline disasters, and the use of conventional weapons in 
large urban areas.  Should these events occur, emergency services 
personnel are tasked with unprecedented, enormous, and sustained 
personal and professional challenges. (American Psychological 
Association [APA] Task Force, n.d., p. 1)  
The death of an emergency responder or family member is the worst potential 
outcome for any agency’s personnel being unprepared.  A lack of invested time, energy, 
or money should not dictate the next steps in responder personal preparedness efforts. 
During the first Gulf War and again in 2003 prior to the United States and Iraq 
war, the Israeli government required certain levels of preparedness.  They issued four 
million gas masks and antidotes (atropine injections) for nerve agents to its citizens to 
increase the citizen’s preparedness level and their confidence to survive an attack (HSI, 
2009).  While Israel has not been a victim of a chemical or biological attack to test the 
effectiveness of this program, the kits do offer a sense of psychological and physical 
resiliency within its populace (HSI, 2009).  Since 1992, the Israeli government has 
required newly constructed homes, apartment buildings, and public buildings to have a 
protective room that is “bomb-resistant and capable of being sealed airtight” (Tucker, 
2003, p. 9).  Airtight would include using plastic sheeting and duct tape to assist in 
sealing the room. 
The United States has not issued nor required any personal preparedness kits for 
its citizens or emergency responders.  In the United States, there is a sentiment the 
responsibility for citizens safety is abdicated to the government as their responsibility.  
While the United States has provided directions on how to create a preparedness kit and 
emergency plan only 57 percent report having supplies set aside for disasters and only 44 
percent report having a household emergency plan (FEMA, 2009).  The United States has 
made available chemical, biological, and other preparedness programs; however, there 
have not been any major drills or exercises that involve a realistic sample of the 
emergency responders who assist in the deployment of these resources in combination 
with their families.   
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Nationwide drills called Turning Point have been conducted in Israel since the 
summer of 2007 (HSI, 2009).  The latest drill, Turning Point 5, was conducted in June, 
2011.  Turning Point 5 tested SMS (Short Message Service) technology using text 
messages, which were used in conjunction with regular emergency alarms.  Additionally, 
this drill gave the public an opportunity to practice using public bomb shelters and 
personal fortified rooms (Greenberg, 2011).  Major General  Yair Golan, Head of the 
Home Front Command and Minister of Home Front Defense Matan Vilnai, stated, 
“Civilians who understand can better deal with emergencies” (Greenberg, 2011, 
concluding paragraph). 
Contrary to this approach is the United States version of Turning Point, called the 
National Level Exercise 2011 (NLE 11); however, the NLE 11 goal was to test the 
objectives of federal, state, and local government (employees) and did not include their 
family members.  A critical element of response to and recovery from disasters is the 
emergency responder families and they should be included in these types of exercises.  
While community preparedness is an important component of national preparedness, 
emergency responders and their families are beset with different challenges in a disaster 
and thus “need more than to simply avoid becoming victims and maintaining basic 
necessities; they must be able to report for assignment in dire conditions” (Landahl & 
Cox, 2009) while fully knowing their families are okay. 
The emergency response organizations that have communications plans and 
responder/responder-family support programs in place are those that have learned of the 
importance of such programs from past experiences (Sturdivant, 2009).  Israel has 
learned throughout the years how important responder and citizen preparedness is and has 
taken steps to increase its citizen’s preparedness and response capabilities.  Integrating 
the families of emergency responders into emergency preparedness drills and exercises, 
as well as providing the supplies needed to sustain them during an all hazard event, will 
assist in the creation of a resilient emergency responder population. 
When responders and their families are prepared for disasters, they have instituted 
a force multiplier in their resilience.  As Stephen Flynn (2007) wrote, we should look at 
our resiliency (or preparedness) in a similar manner as we do going on a camping trip:   
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It would be foolhardy to leave the house without having undertaking some 
basic precautions: checking that the tent is in working order; putting 
together a first aid kit, including all necessary medications; making sure 
there are extra batteries for the flashlights; and letting friends and 
neighbors know the planned itinerary.  But the real benefit of taking the 
time to prepare is the peace of mind that comes with knowing the 
challenges we may encounter on the trail will not ruin the entire trip.  We 
end up worrying less and enjoying ourselves more (p. 9).  
In addition to drills, Israel uses Web-based readiness training for citizen 
preparedness.  Their training appears to exceed the United States on-line training 
showing how to be prepared for a disaster.  The United States currently has four videos 
on preparedness on the Ready.gov Website with each less than five minutes in length.  
Israel’s Web-based, preparedness training uses tutorials that offer step-by-step 
instructions, video clips, illustrations, and directions for multiple types of events from 
mortar fire to floods and fires (HSI, 2009).  This Website “equips the public with the 
knowledge and training to be self-prepared and is a key tool for engaging the public in 
overall readiness” (HSI, 2009, p. 83).   
On February 10, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security released a fact sheet 
on biological agent attacks (FEMA, 2003).  This fact sheet reminded United States 
citizens to have plastic sheeting and duct tape in their preparedness kits to aid in sealing 
off an internal protective room in case of a biological attack.  The information was met 
with mockery by the general public, late night talk show hosts, and media as a ridiculous 
request by the Department of Homeland Security.  What skeptics were not aware of, or 
dismissed as ineffective, is that this technique was used as part of the expedient sheltering 
measure suggested by NATO in 1983 and determined as an appropriate measure to 
reduce infiltration (from a chemical plume) (Sorenson & Vogt, 2001).  Had an 
appropriate on-line training program been put in place to educate the general public, this 
type of ridicule may have been avoided and a lifesaving measure appropriately used if 
needed. 
In all its preparedness initiatives, Israel uses direct engagement with its citizens.  
There are three core reasons why this type of direct engagement with employees and 
family members of emergency responders is significant.  First, family members 
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repeatedly practicing what they have to do during a disaster without their emergency 
responder spouse or significant other will minimize stress and anxiety.  Furthermore, in a 
survey of federal and state emergency responders conducted by Brian Sturdivant of the 
Scottsdale, Arizona Fire Department, “100 percent of the respondents (FSR 1-10) 
expressed to some degree the idea that during any crisis, first responders rely heavily on 
their training to instinctively transition into ‘action and mitigation’ mode” (2009, p. 39).  
This is an important concept to understand to grasp fully the issue of responder personal 
preparedness and is a concept emergency response agencies have used in training for 
years.  For example, law enforcement agencies repetitively train to establish muscle 
memory for when officers draw and fire their weapons and perform defensive tactics.  To 
reduce the risk of traffic crashes, they are trained to scan the horizon from side to side 
when either routinely driving a vehicle or during a vehicle pursuit.     
The second reason why direct engagement is significant is that by increasing 
family participation, there is an increase in dialogue between the agency and the families.  
This will allow interaction between family members and the agency that has not occurred 
in the past and will allow for input in planning realistic exercises.  Additionally, this will 
provide family members a sense of ownership with the agency preparedness program. 
Lastly, the involvement of family members of responders will allow them to 
understand the policies and procedures of the agency during disasters and what agency 
programs are available to support them during a disaster or when their responder is 
deployed to another area of the state or nation.  This will also bolster confidence between 
the agency and the families which aids in establishing a resilient agency. 
It appears the United States is watching and learning from Israel.  On November 
9, 2011 at 2:00 p.m. the first nationwide test of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) was 
conducted.  Similar to Turning Point communication drills, the nationwide EAS test 
ensured the President of United States could activate the system and provide information 
if needed for a national emergency. 
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C. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREPAREDNESS 
After the horrific events of 9/11, President Bush created an executive order 
making citizen preparedness a priority.  The Department of Homeland Security created 
the Citizen Corps as a grassroots approach to increasing the nation’s preparedness level.  
However, it is also critical that emergency responders are prepared to respond to 
catastrophic events, natural or manmade, at a personal and professional level.  To assist 
in developing the emergency responder personal preparedness capability, behavior 
change models need to be reviewed and analyzed to determine the most effective ways to 
improve and advance emergency responder personal preparedness.    
According to Jackson, “A major concern in any catastrophic event is to establish 
adequate governmental presence to reassure the public and maintain order” (Jackson, 
2005, p. 10).  With 61 percent of the people who participated in the 2009 Citizen Corps 
National Survey indicating “they expected to rely on emergency responders in the first 72 
hours following a disaster” (FEMA, 2009, p. 22), the need for emergency responders to 
be prepared is even more significant.  In his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Brian 
Sturdivant states: 
Often, in times of disaster, one of the difficult choices first responders 
must make is to either report for work and to protect the community and 
citizens they are sworn to serve, or to secure the well-being and safety of 
their families. (2009, p. 2) 
An emergency responder’s desire to check on his or her family prior to 
responding to a disaster may be indicative of a lack of confidence he or she has in his or 
her personal preparedness level.  According to psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl Person:  
A special problem is posed during natural disasters by the fact that 
emergency responders, whose primary duty is to assist others, also face 
personal challenges as a result of the disaster.  How to cope on an 
emotional level, during and in the immediate and long-term aftermath of a 
disaster, becomes a central concern for police and other rescue workers.” 
(as cited in Deflem & Sutphin, 2009, p. 46) 
These “personal challenges” could cause stress, which, according to Paton and 
Violanti, “adversely affects performance in circumstances that demand high levels of 
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attention and creative solutions to emergent problems” (as cited in Bongar et al., 2007, p. 
225).  This risk of stress can be decreased if there is an increase in the relationship 
emergency responder organizations have with the responder’s families.  The relationship 
could include implementing family friendly policies and support groups as well as 
allowing input from family members during the response and recovery planning process 
(pre-event) (Bongar et al., 2007).   
There is an assumption in many disaster response plans that emergency 
responders will show up quickly during the response phase of disasters.  However, 
according to Paton and Violanti (as cited in Bongar et al., 2007, p. 232), “A discrepancy 
between plan assumptions and actual behavior creates an additional source of uncertainty 
for protective services officers and further contributes to their stress risk.”  Therefore, as 
Lasker noted (as cited in Bongar et al., 2007), the planning for disasters or other 
catastrophic events should be based on what emergency responders or “protective 
services officers” would actually do or their actual behaviors during the response phase.   
By understanding behavior change models the motivational factors to increase the 
personal preparedness levels of emergency responders may be identified and programs to 
increase preparedness implemented.  There is a vast amount of literature on behavior 
change models or theories.  Nicholas Campasano conducted a review of some of these 
models, including the Citizen Corp personal behavior change model for disaster 
preparedness (PDP) introduced in the fall of 2006 (Opinion Research Corporation [ORC] 
Macro, 2006).  Campasano recognized the importance that behavior change constructs 
have on improving personal preparedness rates and identified gaps and limitations of the 
PDP.    
The PDP model is based on two theoretical models:  1) the extended parallel 
process model (EPPM) and 2) the stages of change/transtheoretical model.  These are 
individual-based, psychosocial behavior models, and Campasano posits that personal 
preparedness activities should be directed more at a community level (2010).  Some may 
define community in the context of living in a defined area or geographic location; 
however, it can also be a relational entity where shared values and norms bring people to 
together (Campasano, 2010).  For example, emergency responders as a whole or as 
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individual disciplines (including their family members) could be considered a 
community.  Therefore, the community readiness theory is applicable to responder 
preparedness.  This theory defines phases a community has to work through in order to 
reduce a problem.  According to Jumper-Thurman, Edwards, Plested, and Oetting (as 
cited in Bernal, Trimble, Burlew, & Leong. 2003, p. 600), “when applied to a reasonably 
focused target audience and focused on a specific issue” the community readiness 
approach is logical to use as an intervention method.  By adding a community level, 
additional influences present themselves which shape ones decisions or behaviors to help 
move through different phases.  These influences could be rules, policies, and social 
norms as a few examples.   
Different intervention strategy theories can be used at the community level to 
support behavior change.  One in particular, the diffusion of innovations theory, has 
already been shown to be effective with law enforcement agencies.  The theory 
“addresses how new ideas, products, and social practices spread within an organization, 
community, or society, or from one society to another” (National Cancer Institute, 2005, 
p. 23).  For example, TASER International introduced an electronic control device (the 
Thomas A. Swift’s Electronic Rifle, commonly known as a TASER).  A few law 
enforcement agencies began using them to help control combative subjects with mostly 
positive results from the law enforcement framework.  Policies, procedures, and use of 
force continuums were created, tested, and modified throughout the years demonstrating 
effectiveness and determining appropriate use.  A TASER has since become a standard 
piece of equipment in many American law enforcement agencies who have shared 
commonalities in its operation.  This same concept, but as a social practice versus piece 
of equipment, could be used in order to increase emergency response disciplines personal 
preparedness levels in conjunction with other behavior change model components. 
A community approach versus an individual approach to behavior change should 
be emphasized with emergency responders.  No matter what theories are used to change 
behavior, those that “target the community level recognize the multi-layered influences 
that shape the individual behaviors” (Campasano, 2010, p. 62).  Reviewing all the 
multiple behavior change models and intervention strategies is beyond the scope of this 
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research; however, the PDP model was “developed to help answer the question—why 
aren’t Americans better prepared for disasters?” (ORC Macro, 2006, p. 12). In addition, 
several questions in the 2009 Citizen Corp Survey were to test the PDP.  Campasano 
noted several limitations to the extended parallel process model and the transtheoretical 
model as used in the PDP model.  The most serious shortcoming Campasano (2010) 
noted was the “lack of recognition of the many community and social influences in 
shaping individual behavior” (p. 120).   
In a presentation by Bourque and Mileti (2008), Public Response to Terrorism in 
America, they identified two information types that drive public action that could assist in 
shaping behavior: 1) information received and 2) information observed.  Observed 
information or cues are actions one takes after witnessing someone else taking action—a 
social influence.  For example, while at a training facility, a group of emergency 
responders who are not personally prepared witness other emergency responders creating 
personal preparedness kits in a classroom.  This could also be considered a community 
influence in that the emergency responder community is working on a common problem 
or issue relevant to the emergency responder culture.  If the one who witnesses the 
preparedness actions is a part of the emergency responder culture, then surely this 
problem or issue would be relevant to them and may cue them to take action or at a 
minimum contemplate taking action. 
Due to the PDP’s limitations and gaps, Campasano recommends a new model 
which incorporates both the community or “systems” approach and an individual 
approach to preparedness behavior change.  According to Campasano, “By integrating 
the community readiness model and the precaution adoption process model, a 
coordinated preparedness program can be developed that utilizes the power of the 
community [italics added] and its inhabitants [italics added] to create behavior change” 
(2010, p. 120).  
Landahl and Cox (2009) conducted a survey of homeland security personnel at 
the local, state and federal level.  Their results are indicative of the need for a behavior 
change to increase responder personal preparedness levels.  Of the organizations 
represented, only 29.2 percent had written plans or policies supporting families of 
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responders during a disaster; only 29.1 percent provide training and education on family 
and employee preparedness; and 70.3 percent do not offer opportunities for responder 
family members or the responders to attend personal preparedness training or education 
(Landahl and Cox, 2009, p. 8). The focus of preparedness at the individual level is not 
effective for emergency responder’s personal preparedness.  The addition of the 
community component with the individual family focus may increase the personal 
preparedness levels thus leading to organizational resilience.  
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
The method used to determine why emergency responders are not prepared and 
factors that may influence increasing their preparedness level involved conducting 
research in the form of online surveys of emergency responders.  The survey was 
designed around four topic areas: profile/demographics (location in the country, race, 
discipline, gender, etc.), stages of change (confidence in current preparedness level, 
reasons for not preparing, agreeability to incentives to increase preparedness levels, etc.), 
risk awareness/perception (likeliness of disasters in their area), and severity (perception 
of impact a disaster will have on them, their family, and community).   
The purpose of the survey was to identify the emergency responder reasons why 
they have not personally prepared themselves and their immediate family members for a 
range of hazards, what barriers are preventing them from creating personal preparedness 
plans, and what incentives would help in fostering personal preparedness plans and 
preparedness kit development. The survey utilized checklists and rating scales to better 
quantify and simplify the results.   
There was one group of survey participants, not identified or associated with 
personal identifying information, consisting of three disciplines of emergency responders: 
law enforcement, fire, and EMS.  These three disciplines were chosen as they are 
“typical” emergency responders whose capabilities are key factors in the initial response 
to and stabilization of disaster scenes.   
If enough data was obtained from each FEMA region, an analysis was to be 
completed to distinguish whether or not an increase in personal preparedness was 
associated with the number of Presidential Disaster Declarations where the responder 
lived.  Year 2000 to 2010 FEMA Presidential Disaster Declaration information and U.S. 
Census Data county codes for the United States were used to gather the data.  
A majority of the survey questions have been replicated from FEMA’s, Personal 
Preparedness in America: Findings from the 2009 Citizen Corp National Survey August 
2009 (FEMA, 2009) and the Are We Ready? Introducing the Public Readiness Index: A 
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Survey-Based Tool to Measure the Preparedness of Individuals, Families and 
Communities from the Council for Excellence in Government (2006).  Additional 
questions, statements, or answers were added to the survey to make a question more 
relevant to the survey population.  For example, type of discipline (fire, EMS, law 
enforcement), rank, personal involvement in a disaster, as well as agreement level with 
statements on preparedness incentives.  These questions assisted in identifying reasons 
why emergency responders are not personally preparing themselves and their immediate 
family members. 
Using the past survey questions from the general public allows preparedness 
comparison/correlation between emergency responders in this survey and the general 
public, which will assist in developing future policy recommendations and programs 
specific to emergency responders personal preparedness levels. 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of the survey and provides analysis of those 
results.  The survey, Emergency Responder Personal Preparedness, was open to 
participants for 31 days (August 23, 2011 to September 24, 2011).  Respondents were 
from 39 states and every FEMA region.  Of the 1,247 respondents who visited the link 
and began the survey, 94.5 percent (n=1,179) completed it.  This does not mean all 
respondents answered every question as they were allowed to skip any questions in the 
survey.  Where relevant, the population of those who answered the survey question is 
given (e.g., n=total number of respondents).  
A. QUESTION 1: SURVEY INTRODUCTION 
This question explained the research study and was used to obtain respondents 
consent to participate in the survey.  If consent was not obtained the participants were 
thanked and removed from the survey instrument.  Of the 1,247 respondents, 99.4 percent 
consented to continue with the survey (n=1,240) and 0.6 percent (n=7) opted out of the 
survey. 
B. QUESTIONS 2, 3, 4, AND 5: REGION/STATE/COUNTY 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. Question 2: In What FEMA Region do You Live?  
This question begins the collection of the respondent’s demographics.  The vast 
majority of respondents, 49.6 percent (n=610), were from Region V (Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin) due to a greater number of the researchers 
contacts for emergency response agencies being from that region and specifically the 
state of Michigan.  The second and third largest survey populations were from Region 
VII (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska), 18.2 percent (n=224), and Region IX 
(Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada), 11 percent (n=135).  The entire survey 
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respondent breakdown by region is shown in Figure 1.  Regions V, VII, and IX were used 
to compare data by regions as they each had over 100 respondents. 
 
 
Figure 1.   FEMA Region Respondents 
2. Question 3: In What State do You Live?   
This question provided respondents with selections of states specific to the FEMA 
region previously selected.  Michigan had the highest number of respondents out of 
Region V at 82.3 percent (n=502); Missouri had the highest number of respondents out of 
Region VII with 77.2 percent (n=173), and California had the highest number of 
respondent out of Region IX at 82.2 percent, (n=111).  See Figures 2, 3, and 4 for the 

























Figure 4.   FEMA Region IX States Respondents 
3. Question 4: In What County do You Live?   
The respondents answer to the previous question, In what state do you live?, 
directed them to this follow up question.  Not enough respondents were identified in 
counties where Presidential Disaster Declarations were declared; therefore, a comparison 
of those counties and the responders’ level of personal preparedness could not be 
completed.  This type of analysis should be considered for future research.   
4. Question 5: I Live in an Area That is Considered… 
The area where responders live (rural, urban or suburban) yielded similar data 




where responders live to their level of preparedness (question number 15), the majority of 
respondents indicated they have been prepared for at least six months, which is consistent 
with the entire survey population (see Figure 5).   
 
 
Figure 5.   Preparedness Level By Residential Area Type 
C. QUESTION 6: GENDER 
The majority of the participants were male with a response rate of 81.8 percent 
(n=978).  The female response rate was 18.2 percent (n=217).  Fifty-two participants 
skipped this question.  
D. QUESTIONS 7 AND 8: RESPONSE DISCIPLINE AND RANK 
The respondents who completed the survey were comprised of a majority of law 
enforcement personnel (n=717) followed by fire (n=332) and EMS (n=256) as shown in 
Table 1.  The discrepancy between the number of respondents by discipline (n=1305) and 
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the total number of respondents who finished the survey (n=1179) is due to some 
respondents selecting multiple disciplines and/or skipping the question.  For example, 
someone who works for a Department of Public Safety (and is tasked with being a fire 
fighter and police officer) may have selected both fire and law enforcement as their 
discipline in the survey.  The findings between disciplines were similar with no discipline 
indicating a significant difference in personal preparedness levels.  
Table 1.   Respondents by Discipline 

































Total n=578 n=223 n=504 n=1305 
Data on the number of full-time, part-time, volunteer, paid on call, private, and 
public employees within the respondent disciplines is shown in Table 2.  The number of 
respondents (n=1313) is also different than the total number of respondents who 
completed the survey for similar reasons as stated above.  For example, someone may 
work in EMS full-time and be a paid on call fire fighter, thus indicating both selections in 
the survey. 
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E. QUESTION 9: RESIDENTIAL DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. Question 9: In Your Current Residence, Do You Live… 
• With family members: 87.3 percent ( n=1,052) 
• With roommates (including boyfriend/girlfriend): 4.3 percent (n=52) 
• With both family members and roommates: 0.9 percent (n=11) 
• Alone: 7.5 percent (n=90) 
 
Figure 6.   Residential Demographics 
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F. QUESTION 10 
1. Question 10: Are There Children under the Age of 18 Living in Your 
Residence?  
• Yes: 54.6 percent (n=655) 
• No: 45.4 percent (n=545) 
G. QUESTION 11 
1. Question 11: Do you Currently Live with or Care for Someone with a 
Disability, Including Someone Elderly, Who Requires Assistance? 
• Yes: 8.7 percent (n=104) 
• No: 91.3 percent (n=1,097) 
 
Figure 7.   Special Needs 
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H. QUESTION 12 
1. Question 12: Have You Ever Been in a Public Emergency Situation 
When You…   
1. had to evacuate or assist with evacuating your own community? 
2. lost electricity for three days, yet still needed to report to work? 
3. could not get in touch with your family? 
4. could not get to the store for three days?   
The question was written to see how disaster situations may impact emergency 
responders.  Of the situations presented, a higher percentage of all emergency responders 
(53.8 percent, n=645) reported that they had been in situations when they lost electricity 
for three days yet still needed to report to work versus the other situations presented to 
them (See Figure 8).  Out of the 1,198 respondents to this question, 53 percent (n=645) 
indicated they still needed to report to work when electricity was lost for three days.  This 
is a similar finding when compared to the general public.  In 2006, when the general 
public was asked this question 52 percent indicated they had to go to work (Council for 
Excellence in Government, 2006, p. 16).   
The majority of the respondents in this survey indicated they have not been in a 
position where they could not get to the store for three days, could not get in touch with 
family members, nor had to evacuate or assist with evacuating their community.  With 
such high percentages of responders indicating they have not been in these types of 
emergency situations, agencies should be conscious of what David Ropeik, Harvard 
School of Public Health, calls “optimism bias,” which means “people generally believe 
bad things will happen only to the ‘other guy’ and ‘not me’” (as cited in Emergency 
Preparedness Institute, Inc., 2007, p. 8).  If someone does not believe that they are 
susceptible to a threat or believes that there is a low likelihood the threat will occur, their 
motivation level to prepare for that threat will be weaker (ORC Macro, 2006).  Not being 
in or conducting exercises for the types of situations as described above will promote the 
optimism bias. 
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There was a difference between FEMA Regions V, VII, and IX in the number of 
respondents who indicated they had lost electricity for three days, yet still needed to 
report to work.  While Region V and VII both showed a higher percentage consistent 
with the overall finding, 61.8 percent (n=367) and 55.2 percent (n=122) respectively, 
Region IX only indicated 21.4 percent (n=28).  This could be due to a number of reasons, 
such as a lower number of disasters causing power outages, restoration of power in a 
timelier manner, or a higher resiliency toward a power related vulnerably, but is beyond 
the scope of this research.  Region X showed a higher percentage, 46.6 percent (n=62), of 
responders who had to evacuate or assist with evacuating their own community versus 
Regions V (27.1 percent, n=161) or VII (39 percent, n=85).   
The majority of responders do not appear to have been in situations where they 
have had to evacuate or assist with evacuating their community, could not get in touch 
with their family, or could not get to a store for three days.  To fracture the optimism bias 
exercises and drills should focus on these types of events in addition to events where 
electricity is lost for three days or more.  Regardless of the causes, the data indicates that 
specific types of vulnerabilities and disasters should be taken into consideration when 
determining the framework of emergency responder preparedness initiatives in order to 




Figure 8.   Emergency Situations 
I. QUESTION 13: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONFIDENCE LEVEL 
1. Question 13: How Confident are You about You and Your Family’s 
Level of Emergency Preparedness?  
As an indicator of overall preparedness, responders were asked to rate primary 
reasons why they are not personally prepared.  Prior to answering any questions on 
preparedness, participants were provided with a definition of what “preparedness” or 
what “prepared” meant in the context of the survey.  This definition explained: 
…when we use the words ‘preparedness’ or ‘prepared,’ we are referring to 
individuals and their immediate family members having BOTH a 
preparedness kit to sustain themselves for at least 72 hours/3 days after an 
event (food, water - 1 gallon/person/day, first aid supplies, flashlight, 




the family reviews annually which explains during a disaster how family 
members will contact one another, where to go if an evacuation is ordered, 
and what you will do in different emergency situations.   
The definition was meant to ensure participants included the components of a 
family emergency plan and specific items in their preparedness kits to assist in validating 
future questions within the survey.  The definition of preparedness is a critical concept.  
According to Gillespie and Streeter, “Only when we agree on what preparedness is will it 
be possible to study systematically its causes and consequences, and to design 
experiments that assess cost and benefits associated with preparedness” (1987, p. 156). 
As shown in Figure 9, the majority of respondents, 40.8 percent (n=490), 
indicated they are somewhat confident about their personal level of emergency 
preparedness, and 39.7 percent (n=476) indicated they were confident in their own and 
their families level of emergency preparedness.  Only 10.4 percent (n=125) indicated they 
were very confident in their personal preparedness level.  The rating average of 2.51 out 
of 4.00 places the average confidence level halfway between responders being somewhat 
confident and confident on the scale provided.  The confidence level becomes more 
relevant when question 15, current personal preparedness level, is compared to this data.  
According to the findings from the FEMA 2009 Citizen Corp National Survey (p. 18), 
“Past research has found that often, participants perceive themselves to be more prepared 




Figure 9.   Confidence Levels in Family Emergency Preparedness 
J. QUESTION 14: CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY TO PREPARE 
1. Question 14: How Confident are You about Your own Ability to 
Prepare for Disaster?   
The average rating for this question was 3.10 (n=1201) out of 4.00, which 
suggests the emergency responders are confident in their own ability to prepared for a 
disaster.  The majority of respondents indicated they were confident, 46.5 percent 
(n=558), or very confident 32.2 percent (n=387), in their preparedness abilities (see 
Figure 10).  Programs such as Ready.gov and specifically the Ready Responder program 
may have contributed to this high confidence level by using social marketing and creating 
tools to assist with personal preparedness.  The Ready Responder program was launched 
in September 2010 by FEMA and CHDS alumna Alicia Welch.  As this fairly new 
program evolves, confidence levels may increase. 
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Figure 10.   Confidence Level in Ability to Prepare 
K. QUESTION 15: PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS LEVEL 
1. In Thinking about Preparing Yourself and Your Family for a Major 
Disaster, Which Best Represents Your Preparedness?  
Of the respondents, 53.2 percent (636) of the emergency responders indicated 
they have been prepared for a major disaster for at least the past six months (see Figure 
11).  In 2009, when asked this same question as part of the FEMA Citizen Corps National 
Survey, only 35 percent of the United States population indicated the same answer (p. 
33).  This may indicate that emergency responders are more personally prepared for 
disasters; however, it could be hubris, a false sense of optimism, or that they are 
overestimating their preparedness level—perceived preparedness versus actual 
preparedness.     
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Figure 11.   Responder Personal Preparedness Level 
Table 3.   Stages of Change Model (From FEMA, 2009) 
 
While FEMA is promising that over half of the emergency responders are 
indicating they are “prepared” for major disasters, there are still just under half who are 




began preparing which translates into them being in an “action stage” (FEMA, 2009, p. 
32).  This is described as recently making overt changes in their preparedness behavior 
according to the stages of change model (see Table 3.   
There were 14 percent (n=167) of the respondents who indicated they had not 
prepared but intended to within the next six months.  These responders are considered to 
be in the “contemplation stage” since they are not taking action to change their 
preparedness behavior at the time but are planning to do so within the next six months 
(FEMA, 2009).  Furthermore, 5.3 percent (n=63) of the respondents had not prepared but 
within the month were intending to prepare.  This has been identified as someone being 
in the “preparation stage” (FEMA, 2009, p. 32), which is indicative of someone who is 
actively considering changing his or her behavior and, with an appropriate nudge, could 
be moved up into the action stage.  The final group of responders would be categorized as 
being in a “precontemplation stage” according to the stages of change model (FEMA, 
2009, p. 32).  This 13.2 percent (n=158) of the survey population indicated they are not 
planning to do anything or about or even thinking about disaster preparedness planning 
and is, therefore, more appropriately called a dormant stage.  Their preparedness level is 
inactive, and, until they reach the point of thinking about preparing or intending to do so 
within a short time frame, they stay at this stage until some type of incentive is 
introduced to increase their preparedness level. 
An assumption prior to this research was that emergency responders would have a 
decreased or equal level of personal preparedness as the general population.  However, it 
has been discovered in other preparedness surveys of the general population that 
respondents may overestimate their actual level of preparedness (actual preparedness 
versus perceived preparedness).  The respondents in this survey may have overestimated 
their preparedness level even though a definition of personal preparedness was provided 
within the survey. 
For example, 57 percent of the general population from the FEMA 2009 Citizen 
Corps National Survey stated they had emergency supplies set aside in their homes 
specifically for disasters.  When asked to identify those items, a majority had food (74 
percent) and water (71 percent) but lacked other crucial supplies such as a “flashlight 
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(42%), first aid kit (39%) or portable radio (20%)” (FEMA, 2009, p. 7).  Respondents in 
the Emergency Responder Personal Preparedness Survey were not asked to identify 
specific items to validate their level of preparedness.  This should be done in future 
surveys if repeated to identify detailed shortfalls within the emergency responder 
community.   
When comparing the responders’ preparedness level to their confidence level 
from question 13, How confident are you about you and your family’s level of emergency 
preparedness?, 18.7 percent  (n=119) are very confident, 57 percent  (n=362) are 
confident, 23.5 percent (149) are somewhat confident, and .8 percent (n=5) are not at all 
confident.  This may suggest that respondents were overestimating their preparedness 
level.  The data could imply that more individuals who have been prepared for at least six 
months, according to the definition provided in the survey, would have higher confidence 
levels in their personal preparedness.  They would have the needed critical supplies for 
disasters, a plan outlining what to do during evacuations, how to contact family members 
and be contacted by family members during disasters, and reviewing annually what to do 
during multiple types of emergencies.   
The confidence rating average of 2.94 out of 4.00 (see Figure 12) places those 
who indicated they were prepared for at least six months just under the confident level 
(rating of 3) and at the upper end of the somewhat confident level (rating of 2).  Those 
who selected they had not prepared but intended to within six months, had not prepared 
but intended to within the next month, or were not planning on doing anything about 
preparing were all near the somewhat confident level of personal preparedness with 
average ratings of 1.81, 2.03, and 2.04 respectively.  
When comparing confidence levels between FEMA Regions V, VII, and IX, the 
results were similar with a majority of the respondents in each (41.2 percent, n=246; 42.5 
percent, n=94; and 40.6 percent, n=54 respectively) indicating they were somewhat 




Figure 12.   Confident Level Rating Average 
L. QUESTION 16: LACK OF PREPAREDNESS REASONS 
1. Question 16: For each of the Following Statements, Please Tell me 
Whether it is the ‘Primary Reason,’ ‘Somewhat of a Reason,’ or ‘Not 
a Reason’ Why You Have not Taken any Disaster Preparedness Steps   
The selections provided were as follows:   
• I have not thought about it 
• I do not think an emergency will happen to me and my family 
• Nothing that I do would be effective or make a difference 
• I do not know what to do 
• I do not know how to prepare a personal emergency preparedness kit and 
plan 
• I do not want to think about it 
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• It costs too much money 
• It is not required by my agency 
This question generated a number of comments in the comment field provided.  
With the majority of the responders previously selecting they had been prepared for at 
least six months, they did not feel the question asked applied to them.  Accordingly, the 
vast majority of participants selected not a reason for the statements (see Figure 13).  
This was consistent among all FEMA regions among survey participants.  That being the 
case, the focus of the analysis was shifted toward those who responded somewhat of a 
reason and primary reason, which still contained a large sample of participants.  Of those 
who provided a response (n=1035), 20.6 percent (n=213) indicated they have not thought 
about disaster preparedness steps as well as it costs too much money to take disaster 
preparedness steps as somewhat of a reason they have not taken any disaster 
preparedness steps.  These two statements also rated the highest as the primary reason for 
not taking any disaster preparedness steps.  Not thinking about disaster preparedness was 
a primary reason for 8.5 percent (n=88) of the respondents and costing too much money 
was a reason for 4.2 percent (n=43) of the respondents.  The third highest rated statement 
was “I do not think an emergency will happen to me and my family.”  The result of this 
statement was that 19 percent (n=196) of the respondents felt it was somewhat of a 
reason why they had not taken any steps and an additional three percent (n=31) felt it was 




Figure 13.   Reasons for Not Preparing 
The responses to this question suggest there are three reasons why responders do 
not take personal preparedness steps: (1) they have not thought about it; (2) it costs too 
much money; and (3) they do not think an emergency will happen to them or their family.  
An additional reason with 17.2 percent (n=178) of the population is that they do not want 
to think about it. 
M. QUESTIONS 17, 18, 19, AND 20: AGENCY PLANS AND PROTOCOLS 
1. Question 17: My Agency Has a Disaster Preparedness Plan and 
Protocols 
The majority of respondents agreed to some extent that their agencies had disaster 
preparedness plans and protocols (rating average of 4.67 out of 5.00, n=1,188).  Of the 
respondents, 40.3 percent (n=479) agreed with the statement followed by 26.7 percent 
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(n=317) strongly agreeing, and 18.9 percent (n=224) somewhat agreeing (see Figure 14).  
These ratings were similar within each respective emergency response discipline.    
 
 
Figure 14.   Agency Disaster Plans and Protocols 
2. Question 18: I am Familiar with my Agency’s Disaster Preparedness 
Plan and Protocols 
When comparing having plans and protocols against being familiar with them 
there is a slight decrease in the agreeability rating average (rating average of 4.43, 
n=1,179).  The strongly agree selection decreases to 21.4 percent (n=252), the agree 
selection decreases to 35.8 percent (n=422), and the somewhat agree selection increases 
to 24.3 percent (n=287) (see Figure 15). The number of respondents who are familiar 
with their agency’s disaster preparedness plans and protocols has a fairly consistent 
agreeability rating.  The slight decrease could suggests that outreach should be done in 
conjunction with annual training so that responders are more familiar with the roles and  
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responsibilities they have during a disaster as well as what roles and responsibilities 
supervisors and commanders have to ensure their employees are safe and effective during 
all phases of a disaster.  
Defining what “being familiar with” the agency preparedness plans and protocols 
should be further evaluated in future research.  Is being familiar just knowing the plan or 
protocol is written or would it be better to ask if they are exercised? 
 
 
Figure 15.   Familiarization with Agency Disaster Plans and Protocols 
3. Question 19: My Agency Has a Policy that Requires Me to Have a 
Personal Preparedness Kit and Emergency Plan at My Home 
Even though the survey suggests emergency response agencies have disaster 
response plans and protocols in place the number of those who require responders to have 
a personal preparedness kit and emergency plan at their home appears to be minimal with 
a rating average of 1.90 (n=1,172).  The data indicates that 42.5 percent (n=498) and 40.8 
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percent (n=478) strongly disagree or disagree respectively with the statement provided 
(see Figure 16).  Additionally, a previous survey, conducted in 2009 of homeland security 
professionals who graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (CHDS) master’s degree program, indicated that only “29% of the 
respondents reported their organizations had written plans to support the families of 
responders” (Landahl & Cox, 2009, p. 10) during disasters.   
Emergency responders have indicated their agencies do not have a policy that 
requires them to be personally prepared with a preparedness kit and written plan for their 
family. The previous mentioned CHDS survey conducted by Landahl and Cox (2009) 
indicated that 29 percent of the organizations do not have plans to support their 
employees families during disasters; therefore, how can emergency response agency 
commanders be assured their responders are able and willing to report for duty during a 
disaster to help others if they do not require personal preparedness that would ensure the 
responders families are safe during a disaster?  
 
Figure 16.   Personal Preparedness Requirements 
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4. Question 20: If My Agency Required it by Policy I Would be More 
Likely to Create and Maintain a Personal Preparedness Kit and 
Emergency Plan at My Home and for My Family 
This statement generated a rating average of 4.17 (n=1,174), which is just above 
the somewhat agree rating; however, a majority of the respondents, 33.3 percent (n=391) 
agree with the statement and 23.9 percent (n=280) somewhat agreed, and 16.3 percent 
(n=191) strongly agreed (see Figure 17).  Therefore, the inference is that IF agencies put 
a personal preparedness policy in place that requires the creation and maintenance of a 
personal preparedness kit and emergency plan at their home and for their family, then the 
responders are more likely to increase their personal preparedness. 
According to Bertram, Landahl, and Williams, “leaders should develop clear 
expectations through policy and planning: including a Mission Statement and Strategic 
Plan” (2011, p. 35) in order to increase the chances of law enforcement officers to report 
for a critical situation.  While the context of the statement was for law enforcement, this 
applies to any emergency response organization.  Creating policy that is clear provides 
responders with the expectations of the agency and public before a disaster occurs and 
fosters agency resilience (Bertram, Landahl, & Williams, 2011).  These policies should 
include:  
1. emergency recall guidelines 
2. hold-over guidelines 
3. schedule assignments 
4. levels of mobilization 
5. civilian support staff 
6. logistical support 
7. family support 
8. anticipated emergencies 
9. policy enforcement/discipline guidelines 




Figure 17.   Policy Requirement Effects 
N. QUESTIONS 21 AND 22: PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS TRAINING 
1. Question 21: My agency Conducts Annual Training Specific to 
Personal Preparedness for Emergencies 
Annual training conducted specific to personal preparedness returned a rating 
average of 2.78 (n=1,175) or just below somewhat disagree.  There were 30.8 percent 
(n=362) of the respondents who disagreed with this statement followed by 25 percent 
(n=294), who strongly disagreed with the statement (see Figure 18).  Pre-September 11, 
2001, under the Nunn-Luger-Domenici domestic preparedness programs, emergency 
response agencies received terrorism awareness training.  After September 11, 2001, 
additional training in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives 
(CBRNE) training has been provided to emergency responders.  Some of these agencies  
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have required annual updates or refresher training; however, the data suggests that 
personal preparedness training within emergency response agencies may be lacking or 
nonexistent.   
 
 
Figure 18.   Personal Preparedness Annual Training 
2. Question 22: If my Agency Included Personal Preparedness and 
Emergency Planning into Annual Training, I Would Prepare a 
Personal Preparedness Kit and Emergency Plan at My Home and For 
My Family 
This follow-up to question number 21 returned a rating average of 4.34 (n=1,169) 
or just below halfway between somewhat agree and agree.  Of the respondents 36.4 
percent (n=426) agreed with this statement, and 32.9 percent (n=385) somewhat agreed 
(see Figure 19).  This suggests that if agencies did have annual personal preparedness 
training, emergency responders would be more likely to prepare a personal preparedness  
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kit and emergency plan for their home and family.  In comparing FEMA Regions V, VII, 
and IX, a higher percentage of respondents in Region V indicated they somewhat agree 
(35.2 percent, n=205) with the statement. 
 
Figure 19.   Personal Preparedness Training Requirement Effects 
O. QUESTION 23: INCENTIVES:  PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS   
1. Question 23: If My Agency Included as Part of My Performance 
Evaluations or Performance Management Plans to Have Personal 
Preparedness Kits at Home and Emergency Plans on File at My 
Home, I Would be More Likely to Create and Maintain Them 
The rating average for this question is 4.17 (n=1,160).  This places the 
respondents average rating slightly above the rating of somewhat agree.  Overall, 32.7 
percent (n=379) selected that they agreed with the question, 23.4 percent (n=271) 
somewhat agreed, and 18.2 percent (n=211) strongly agreed.  Therefore, annual 
performance objectives for emergency responders requiring them to have and maintain a 
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personal preparedness kit as well as a written emergency plan for their family may 
increase their personal preparedness level.  Performance objectives, similar to a policy or 
procedure, should have clear disaster response and preparedness expectations.  
 
Figure 20.   Performance Management Plan Effects 
P. QUESTIONS 24, 25, AND 26: INCENTIVES:  MONEY AND TIME 
1. Question 24: If My Agency Paid for it, I Would Create and Maintain 
a Personal Preparedness Kit and Emergency Plan at My Home and 
for My Family 
Of all the incentives from the survey, agencies paying for responders to create and 
maintain personal preparedness kits and plans had the highest rating average, 5.02 out of 
6.00 (n=1,160).  Respondents rated strongly agree (45.1 percent, n=523) as the highest, 
followed by agree (31.6 percent, n=367), and somewhat agree (12.8 percent, n-149) as 




Figure 21.   Incentive of Pay Effects 
2. Question 25: If My Agency Allowed Me One Hour a Year on Duty 
Status to Create and Maintain a Personal Preparedness Kit and 
Emergency Plan at My Home and for My Family, I Would Do it 
On duty time was another incentive the survey measured.  One hour a year 
returned a rating average of 4.55 out of 6.00 (n=1,159), which places the average just 
above halfway between somewhat agree and agree.  The selection with the highest rating 
from the respondents was agree with 33.7 percent (n=391), followed by strongly agree 
(26.8 percent, n=311), and somewhat agree (21.2 percent, n=246) (see Figure 22).  
3. Question 26: If my Agency Allowed me Two Hours a Year on Duty 
Status to Create and Maintain a Personal Preparedness Kits and 
Emergency Plan at My Home and for My Family, I Would do it 
This question was asked to determine if an additional hour would provide more 
incentive to create personal preparedness kits and plans.  The rating average increased to 
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4.63 (n=1,152) and moved the largest percentage of respondents to strongly agree (31.7 
percent, n=365) (see Figure 23).  This trend was also consistent within FEMA Regions V 
and IX. 
The incentives of pay, annual training, and duty time suggest that if these 
incentives were used as indicated, there may be an increase in the personal preparedness 
levels of emergency responders. Based on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the 
New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) took this approach prior to Hurricane Gustav in 
2008, as cited in Bertram et al. (2011).  Officers were allowed paid time off to ensure 
their families were prepared and evacuated.  
 




Figure 23.   Incentive of Two Hours of Duty Time 
Q. QUESTION 27: RISK AWARENESS AND PERCEPTION 
1. Question 27: On a Scale of ‘Not Likely’ to ‘Very Likely’ How Likely 
Do You Think…Some Type of Natural Disaster Will Ever Occur in 
Your Community?; Some Type of Terrorism Will Ever Occur in 
Your Community?; Some Type of Hazardous Materials Accident Will 
Ever Occur in Your Community?; Some Type of Disease Outbreak 
Will Ever Occur in Your Community?   
Of the four questions presented, the rating averages indicate that a natural disaster 
(2.97, n=1,174) and hazardous materials accident (2.90, n=1,170) are what responders 
likely believe will occur in their community.  The lowest rating average was for an act of 
terrorism occurring in their community with a 1.91 rating average (n=1,171), which is 
just below the rating of somewhat likely.  Of the respondents, 38.8 percent (n=454) 
indicated that terrorism will not likely occur in their community, and an additional 37.7 
percent (n=441) indicated it was only somewhat likely (see Figure 24). 
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The rating average for some type of disease outbreak occurring in their 
community was slightly higher at 2.22 (n=1,170) which is just above the rating of 
somewhat likely.  Of the respondents, 47 percent (n=550) believe that it is somewhat 
likely that a disease outbreak will occur in their community. 
Although a smaller sample, in other regions the findings were similar in that the 
occurrence of natural hazards and hazardous materials accidents were considered more 
likely than a terrorist event or disease outbreak.  On the other hand, 30.9 percent (n=25) 
of FEMA Region III respondents, where the majority of respondents were from Virginia 
(47 percent, n=40), indicated it was very likely that some type of terrorism will occur in 
their community.  This is not surprising due to its proximity to the National Capital 
Region and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
 
Figure 24.   Disaster Awareness 
How likely it is for a disaster to occur is only part of the equation when 
determining what factors should be used to change the preparedness behavior of someone 
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who is not personally prepared.  There is an additional component that needs to be 
considered and that is how severely the impact of a disaster is or how one may be harmed 
by the threat (ORC Macro, 2006). 
R. QUESTIONS 28, 29, 30, AND 31: SEVERITY OF EVENTS 
The following four questions were asked to gauge how severe responders felt 
certain events would affect them and their families.  Each question had a response of not 
severe, somewhat severe, severe, and very severe.  The questions were as follows: 
Question 28: If you are on duty and a natural disaster, such as an 
earthquake, a hurricane, a flood, a tornado, or wildfires, were to happen 
in your community how severe do you think the impact would be to you 
and your family? 
Question 29: If you are on duty and an act of terrorism, such as a 
biological, chemical, radiological, or explosive attack were to happen in 
your community how severe do you think the impact would be to you and 
your family? 
Question 30: If you are on duty and a hazardous materials accident, such 
as a transportation accident or a nuclear power plant accident, were to 
happen in your community how severe do you think the impact would be to 
you and your family? 
Question 31: If you are on duty and highly contagious disease outbreak, 
such as a bird flu epidemic, were to happen in your community how severe 
do you think the impact would be to you and your family? 
The likelihood of a terrorist event occurring was rated the lowest in likelihood of 
occurring (lower frequency) compared to other events (see question 27); however, 
terrorist acts (such as a chemical, biological, radiological or explosive attack) generated 
the highest rating average for severity (higher consequence) to the responders and their 
family with a rating of 2.97 out of 4.00 (n=1,168) or just below the severe rating.  Of the 
respondents, 42.6 percent (n=497) rated terrorist acts as having a severe impact to them 
and their family (see Figure 25).  Additionally, the next highest rating averages for 
severity (which the data from this survey showed  responders believed were less likely to 
occur in a community compared to a natural disaster) were from a highly contagious 
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disease outbreak (average rating of 2.72, n=1,164) and a hazardous materials accident 
(average rating of 2.70, n=1,155).  If a bird flu epidemic or hazardous materials accident 
occurred in the responders’ community while they were on duty, 39.5 percent (n=460) 
and 37.6 percent (n=434) of the respondents indicated it would have a severe impact on 
them and their family (see Figures 26 and 27).   
As shown in Figure 28, a natural disaster was rated as having a somewhat severe 
impact by 45.6 percent of the respondents (n=535) with the lowest rating average of 2.49 
out of 4.00 (n=1,172).  Therefore, the data suggests that while terrorism and contagious 
disease events are considered by emergency responders to have a lower probability (NOT 
low probability) of occurring, they are higher consequence events that will affect them 
and their families.  
 



























Figure 28.   Disaster Impact: Natural Disaster Event 
The responses also suggest that a hazardous material accident is not only viewed 
as likely to occur in the responders’ community, but would severely impact them and 
their families if it occurred.  Even though it is suggested that a terrorist event and disease 
outbreak is not as likely to occur in their communities, respondents indicated that both 
types of events would severely impact emergency responders and their families.  These 
findings are important as the greater the perception of susceptibility and/or severity 
someone has to a particular threat, the stronger motivation to be personally prepared 
(ORC Macro, 2006).  Therefore, training, planning, and preparing for events should take 
into account both events that are high frequency, low consequence, and low frequency, 
high consequence, and not one versus the other; however, a focus should be on the events 
that are higher consequence and higher probably for the area in which the responders 
work.   
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For example, research data from 3,300 households was obtained from April 2007 
to February 2008 to determine if preparedness actions were specifically taken due to 
terrorism or any reason (including terrorism) (Bourque, Kano, Mileti, & Wood, 2001).  
Two findings were that “very few people have prepared exclusively with the threat of 
terrorism in mind” and that “less than three percent of the national sample reported doing 
any of the other preparedness activities due only to the terrorism threat” (Bourque et al., 
2001, p. 9).  Recognizing all types of hazards as motivators for risk-reduction and not 
focusing on only one hazard may increase preparedness levels or the motivation to begin 
preparing for a disaster. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The data suggests that a higher number of emergency responders (53.2 percent) 
consider themselves as being prepared for at least the past six months for a major disaster 
compared to 35 percent of the general population indicating the same just two years prior.  
This is contrary to the assumption made at the beginning of this research that emergency 
responders have a decreased level of personal preparedness. A common limitation in both 
this research and other personal preparedness research of the general population is the 
data is self-reported.  The question naturally arises as to accuracy of the high number of 
emergency responders who indicated they are prepared as compared to the general 
public.  The data indicates responders are more prepared; however, the data also revealed 
the confidence level in their personal preparedness to be only between somewhat 
confident and confident (only 10.4 percent indicated they were very confident).  This 
leads to the belief that the actual preparedness level of responders may be closer to that of 
the general public and that the self-reported preparedness level is possibly exaggerated, 
optimism, or hubris. 
Future research on this topic should more accurately measure what the 
responders’ definition of preparedness is as well as confirm preparedness levels through 
additional questions specific to preparedness kit items, plan components, etc.  Not 
enough regional data was obtained to provide analysis between the FEMA regions in the 
United States and Presidential Disaster Declarations in those areas; therefore, 
frequency/magnitude of disaster declarations could not be analyzed as a potential 
motivator to prepare personally.   
A high number of responders being personnel prepared would be promising.  The 
public depends on emergency responders to assist them and bring order after chaos.  
Responder personal preparedness would also indicate a level of sufficient training and 
practice; however, the reported preparedness level of responders could be based upon 
hazards that would only allow for a positive outcome.  For example, the data suggests 
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that a natural disaster and hazardous materials accident are the two most likely scenarios 
that will occur in the respondent’s communities.  By planning for these salient events and 
not low frequency, high consequence events (e.g., terrorism or disease outbreak), the 
comfort of preparedness may “engender complacency or fatalism” (Tierney, Lindell, & 
Perry, 2001, p. 11).  Emergency responders should not prepare for the one or two 
common disasters while ignoring a potentially more serious one.  
According to Rick Ponting, “experience reduces skepticism among organizational 
decision makers, and thus increases the likelihood of responsiveness” (as cited in 
Gillespie and Streeter, p. 158).  Therefore, past experiences with first responders should 
be used to develop a disaster subculture.  According to Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001), 
there are three factors that are thought to promote the development of a disaster 
subculture:  
1. communities must repeatedly experience the impacts of a disaster;  
2. those repeated impacts must result in significant damage; and  
3. having advanced knowledge of the threats contributes to the creation of 
the subculture.   
Kueneman and Wright found that agencies with a disaster subculture modified 
their plans after a disaster 25 percent more often than those agencies without a disaster 
subculture (as cited in Gillespie and Streeter, 1987, p. 158).  Furthermore, M & H 
Engineering, Memphis State University, and Gillespie et al., found that disaster 
preparedness within an organization, including the assignment of tasks and having policy 
and procedures in place, can help “normalize” the disaster impact on response agencies 
and facilitate effective operations (as cited in Gillespie and Streeter, 1987, p. 159).   
Three reasons were identified from this research as to why emergency responders 
do not personally prepare for disasters; (1) they have not thought about it; (2) it costs too 
much money; and (3) they do not think an emergency will happen to them or their family.  
While administrative aspects were not initially identified as a reason why the responders 
do not personally prepared, these became apparent when analyzing the responses to 
survey questions on incentives/motivations.   
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These incentives or motivational attributes identified that can assist in increasing 
the emergency responders’ personal preparedness levels include:  
1. updating policies and procedures to provide clear expectations for 
personal preparedness;  
2. provide annual training specific to personal preparedness;  
3. integrate personal preparedness components into performance 
management plans/performance evaluations;  
4. paying for the preparedness kits/plans;  
5. provide duty time to create and update personal preparedness kits. 
When trying to increase responder personal preparedness, the reasons and 
incentives can be categorized into three emergency responder agency focus areas: 
awareness of the issue, funding, and administrative.  The incentives or motivations can 
then be applied in order to assist with increasing and/or motivating responders to prepare 
personally (see Table 4). 
Table 4.   Focus Areas 
 Why have responders not taken preparedness 
steps? 
Incentive/Motivation 
They have not thought 
about personal 
preparedness. 
Provide annual training specific to 
personal preparedness measures. I. 
Awareness of the 
Issue They do not think an emergency will happen to 
them or their family. 
Provide educational opportunities 
to responders and their families on 
the risk susceptibility and severity. 
II. 
Funding 
It costs too much money. Provide kits and planning materials 
or funding. 
No department policy or 
procedure requiring it. 
Implement specific 
policies/procedures for responder 
personal preparedness. 
It is not a part of 
performance 
management/evaluations. 
Create performance management 




They need time. Allow duty time to create and 




1. Define Emergency Responder Personal Preparedness (Focus Area I) 
A working definition of responder personal preparedness is needed prior to any 
steps being taken to identify emergency responder’s personal preparedness levels or to 
change behaviors to increase responder personal preparedness.  According to 
Kirschenbaum (2002), four capabilities which are required for this definition are:  
1. provisions: critical supplies appropriate for the area;  
2. skill-level: ones knowledge and ability to act during an emergency or 
disaster;  
3. planning: how the community of responders and their families will act in a 
coordinated manner; and  
4. protection: the ability to overcome, mitigate, or minimize the results of a 
disaster.   
The definition should go beyond simply stating one needs to have a 72-hour kit. 
2. Implement a Community Approach to Responder Personal 
Preparedness (Focus Area I) 
A community approach to responder personal preparedness should be 
implemented by focusing on the target audience or community of emergency responders 
and their family members.  There is a shared interest among these members of the 
emergency responder community to solve a common problem.  This community 
approach recognizes the multi-layered influences that shape the community members 
individual behaviors.  These influences include the spouse, significant other, children, 
and reliance on other responders, their families, and the agency, as well as friendships 
among multiple disciplines.  Innovations that are successful for one community of 
responders should be shared with the broader responder community.  This diffusion of 
innovations theory has already been proven to be effective.  
Direct engagement with the responder’s families is significant for taking steps to 
increase personal preparedness.  Family members who practice what they have to do 
during a disaster without their emergency responder spouse, significant other, father, 
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mother, etc. will minimize stress and anxiety due to repetitive drills and exercises in 
conjunction with the respective emergency response agency.  Just as responders train in 
order to instinctively transition into action and mitigation mode, their family members 
must do the same to be properly prepared. 
Direct engagement is also significant in that it increases the dialogue between the 
response agency and family members thus allowing input into scenario planning.  Critical 
influencing factors may be missed during scenario planning if the family needs are not 
taken into consideration. 
A final aspect of direct engagement, within this community approach, is that the 
family members would have a better understanding of the agency policies and procedures 
for disaster response as well as what programs are available to support the family during 
a disaster when their responder is deployed intra- or inter- state. 
3. Require and Create Emergency Responder Personal Preparedness 
Kits and Plans (Focus Areas I, II, and III) 
Emergency responder personal preparedness should be implemented as a 
component of annual training, job readiness, and performance management.  Responder 
personal preparedness is defined as the emergency responder having an appropriate 72-
hour preparedness kit for their family and one for themselves for on-duty activation.  
Additionally, this includes the necessary written emergency plan for their family to 
ensure their safety during a disaster when the responder is responding to aid others and is 
unable to go home. 
4. Conduct Realistic Drills and Exercised (Focus Area I) 
In conjunction with implementing emergency responder preparedness kits and 
plans, the agency should increase direct engagement with their personnel and their 
immediate family members in drills and exercises.  This will allow families of responders 
to be familiar with agency response procedures during a disaster or mobilization of 
personnel, as well as minimize concern for the emergency responder by the family and 
for the family by the emergency responder due to plans being put in place to ensure the 
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safety of both.  This will likely increase the effectiveness of the responders during an 
incident as they will be more focused on the emergency situation versus wondering about 
their family and whether they were prepared or are safe.   
The training, planning, equipping, and preparing for disasters should consider 
high frequency, low consequence events, and low frequency, high consequence events—
not one or the other.  The greater the perception of susceptibility and/or severity someone 
has to a particular threat, the stronger motivation to be personally prepared (ORC Macro, 
2006).   
For example, research data from 3,300 households was obtained from April 2007 
to February 2008 to determine if preparedness actions were specifically taken due to 
terrorism or any reason (including terrorism) (Bourque et al., 2001).  Two findings were 
that “very few people have prepared exclusively with the threat of terrorism in mind” and 
that “less than three percent of the national sample reported doing any of the other 
preparedness activities due only to the terrorism threat” (Bourque et al., 2001, p. 9).  
Recognizing all types of hazards as motivators for risk-reduction and not focusing on 
only one hazard may increase preparedness levels or the motivation to begin preparing 
for a disaster. 
5. Create a Web-Based Training Program for Responders and Their 
Families (Focus Area I) 
Emergency response agencies should implement a Web-based training system for 
responder and family preparedness training. Web-based training on realistic emergency 
situations should be incorporated into annual department member training and made 
available for family members of emergency responders.  
Scenarios should use dramatic plots to elicit curiosity and impart a sense of 
urgency while rhetorical narration increases comprehension through immersion in the 
story as a character experiencing the plot (Weinschenk, 2009).  Instead of passive Web-
based training, an active Web-based training system that inserts the trainee into an 
unfolding plot and requires specific tasks that would test their self-efficacy during 
disasters. 
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6. Create an Emergency Responder Resilience Grant Program 
(ERRGP) (Focus Area III) 
Homeland security can be improved by providing more resources, training, and 
explicit funding to promote and implement first responder resilience programs (personal 
and professional).   
The Citizen Emergency Response Training (CERT) and the FEMA Are You 
Ready campaign are geared toward increasing voluntary citizen preparedness as well as a 
voluntary citizen response capability.  Emergency responders do not have the option to 
assist voluntarily during a disaster—they must respond to ensure citizen safety and 
security while maintaining order.  Emergency responders may also have to deal with 
personal challenges as a result of the disaster.  Emergency responders and their agencies 
need specific funding and educational programs to ensure responders remain resilient and 
fully operational during a disaster.  The pilot program, Ready Responder (Welch 
Launches, 2010, July), is a step in the right direction; however, in conjunction with the 
Ready Responder initiative, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) should incorporate funding under an Emergency 
Responder Resilience Grant Program (ERRGP).   
As part of the ERRGP, the DHS should add a national priority of Responder 
Preparedness: Strengthening Responder Resiliency and special guidance for first 
responder resilience should be given in the Target Capabilities List (TCL).  Currently, no 
specific guidance is given to “deal directly with the individual and family preparedness of 
responders” (Landahl & Cox, 2009).  A core element of any disaster response is the 
capability of the emergency responders and the HSGP purpose is to provide “a primary 
funding mechanism for building and sustaining national preparedness capabilities” 
(FEMA, 2010a.).  If the resiliency and capabilities of emergency responders is not looked 
upon as a priority, what good will all the planning, training, exercising, and equipping 
under the HSGP be if responders do not show up due to concerns for their families’ 
safety? 
 78
The ERRGP will provide a funding source for emergency response agencies to 
implement a nationwide emergency responder program similar to the Citizen Corp.  This 
program will allow emergency response agencies and responders the ability to fund 
preparedness kits, provide specific training to responders and their families (that is 
unique to responders and their families), and create secondary locations to house, feed, 
and care for family members who may have been affected by the disaster.  General 
citizen preparedness is not sufficient for responders or family members to ensure personal 
preparedness due to the added stress of being required to help others when they are not 
being helped or not prepared. 
The general public would benefit the most from the implementation of the 
ERRGP.  A 2005 study by Thomas Nestel utilizing the 15 National Planning Scenarios 
revealed, “55–66 percent of police officers reported they would refuse to adhere to an 
emergency recall or would consider abandoning their position based upon concerns for 
the safety of their family” (as cited in Landahl & Cox, 2009, p. 3).  If a large number of 
emergency responders are absent or assisting their families during a disaster, the affected 
areas are more vulnerable to the criminal element as well as civil disorder.  Due to their 
families being cared for and helped, the ERRGP will give emergency responders the 
capability to stay focused on their tasks during a disaster.  As a result, the general public 
will receive more efficient and effective service during and post-disaster. 
To initiate this idea, the DHS needs to establish the ERRGP in future homeland 
security grants by allocating or shifting funds from other programs.  For example, 
Operation Stonegarden could be replaced with the U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement 
Detachment Teams to “prevent terrorism, secure U.S. borders, (and) disrupt criminal 
organizations” (Fact Sheet, 2010, February 1).  A funding shift previously occurred with 
the creation of the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP).  The 
LETPP was needed to ensure funding was going to “provide law enforcement and public 
safety communities with funds to support intelligence gathering and information sharing” 
(Archived, 2008); therefore, a new grant program was created.  This new shift in funding 
will give emergency response agencies and their leadership the incentive to ensure their 
agency and responders have the capabilities to respond to a disaster.  In conjunction with 
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the ERRGP, the Ready Responder program should be utilized so that standardized 
training for emergency responder-family preparedness is implemented nationwide.    
With implementation of the ERRGP, a standardized emergency responder-family 
preparedness planning, training, exercising, and equipping program would be instituted.  
The program would provide: (1) emergency responder-family preparedness kits/training 
(including evacuations and sheltering in place), (2) communication plans between 
responders’ families and their response agency, and (3) sheltering locations for 
responders’ families that provide basic necessities during a disaster.  A baseline 
assessment of responders’ capabilities would be completed with a post assessment to 
gauge progress.  The ERRGP requirements and quarterly report would include: an 
emergency responder-family preparedness annex added to existing agency plans, the 
number of training sessions and personnel trained (both responders and family members), 
the number of emergency preparedness kits created and issued, and the completion of 
secondary shelter locations.  The ERRGP would be accurately measured with success or 
failure during exercises and disasters.  The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation 
Program (HSEEP) would also be used to evaluate program effectiveness and evolve the 
program through feedback.    
Emergency response agencies, their personnel and their families will need to 
invest their time and effort in order to create a successful culture of preparedness and 
organizational resilience.  Going back to Flynn’s analogy of the camping trip, many 
families would be hard pressed not to invest.  Responders and their families should be 
educated on the hazards of disasters with the risk being personalized.  By showing them 
how to prepare, why it is important, and provide the tools needed to accomplish this, they 
are given the psychological armor to protect them from the “emotional intensity of 
emergency situations” (APA Task Force, n.d., p. 1). 
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